RECENT CASES.
To WnicH TitusTE G-rs Trm.,-INsuaAxct
BANKUPrCY-PROPE T
PoLlcls--An insurance policy on life of bankrupt was payable to certain
relatives, but reserved to bankrupt the absolute right to change the beneficiary. Held: Trustee in bankruptcy was entitled to the cash surrender
value of the policy, under the Bankruptcy Act. July s. 1898, e. 54t, See. 7oa,
which provides that the trustee shall be vested with title to all . . . (3)
Powers which the bankrupt might have exercised for his own benefit . . .
and (5) Property which he could by any means have transferred: Provided.
That when any bankrupt shall have any insurance policy wh;ch has a cash
surrender value payable to himself, his estate, or personal representatives.

he may . . . pay or secure to the trustee the sum so ascertained and
stated, and continue to hold, own, and carry such poliey free from the claimn
of creditors . . . otherwise the policy shall pass to the trustee as assets.
In re Samuels, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 36 (gxsn).
The interpretation of Sec. 70 has given the coucs great.difflculty. The
thorniest question is what constitutes a cash surrender value. The proviso
to Sec. 7oa, s has been construed in the lower courts in two different ways.
First, that all policies payable to the bankrupt were property which he might
have transferred, and so passed to the trustee, except that the bankrupt
could redeem those policies having a cash surrender value. In re Coleman.
136 F. 868 (igos); In re White, z74.F. = (xgo9); In re Hettling, 175
F. 65 (igog). A policy having no cash surrender value, but being valuable
otherwise, passed to the trustee, but without being redeemable. In re
Slingluff, io6 F. 154 (igoo); Van Kirk v. Vermont Slate Co., to F. 38
(xgos). This construction regarded the proviso as being passed in tenderness to the bankrupt. A second construction was that no policies passed to
the trustee except such as had a surrender value, and they only to the extent
of the surrender value if the bankrupt or his representatives paid that
amount to the trustee. In re Welling, 113 F. 189 (i9o2). This regarded the
proviso as additional legislation intended to prevent the trustee from shnply
gambling on the bankrupt's life, and so delaying the winding up of the
estate.
Of course it is well settled that a trustee does not take title to a polky
which gives nothing but the right to speculate on the bankrupt's life. Gould v
New York Life Ins. Co, 132 F. 924 (i904). The difficulty is that a Po icy
often has no cash surrender value, but a very great value as collateral for a
loan, as for instance a tontine investment policy such as was dealt with in
In re Slingluff, upra, and In re Mertens, 142 F. 44s (:9o6). In such a case
the court insisted that there was no reason why the deposits of the assured
in a life insurance company to secure a sum payable to himself at a givea
date if he ihould be then alive, should be treated differently from a similar
contract with a savings bank: In re Slingluff, jupr.
In the Supreme Court it was decided in Hiscock v. Mertens. 30S U. S.
202 (Ow7), that the cash surrender value need not be given by the terms of
the policy if it exists by the practice of the company. This is now settled law.
In re Herr, 182 F. 716 (193o). In Burlingham v. Crouse, aa8 U. S. 459 (1913).
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the court held that where there was no cash surrender value either by contract or custom of the company, the title did not pass. This seemed a clear
adoption of the second construction. But in fact there was no value which
the bankrupt could have transferred in that case, for the company had
loaned the bankrupt the full surrender value on the policy as collateral.
Under either construction, therefore, according to the rule in Gould v. Ins.
Co., .upra, the trustee could not take title to the policy. In Everett v. Judson, 228 U. S. 474 (19z3), and Andrews v. Partridge, 228 U. S. 47p. (1913),
it was held that where the bankrupt died before the estate was closed, his
representatives could retain the proceeds of the policy after paying the cash
surrender value to the trustee. As in both cases there was by contract a
cash surrender value, neither case is a rejection of the first construction.
In In re Hammel, 22x F. 56 (i916), the policy in question had a collateral loan value, but no surrender value, and was payable to wife of bankrupt with the right reserved to bankrupt to change the beneficiary. It was
* held, on the authority of Burlingham v. Crouse, supra, that the bankrupt
-would
not be required to change the beneficiary to himself and raise a loan
on the policy. This case seems clearly wrong, for the right was certainly a
"power which the bankrupt might have exercised for his own benefit.' The
Circuit Court in the principal case, whose decision was reversed, decided the
case on the apparent authority of In re Hammel, supra, forgetting the all
important difference that there was in the principal case a cash surrender
value, not merely a value as loan collateral. In doing so, they went in the
face of the overwhelming weight of authority. In "e Wolf, 65 F. 984
(iz8) ; In re White, 174 F. 333 (xgog); In re Hettling, supra; In re Orear,
j78 F. 632 (i9io); In re Herr, supra; In "e Dolan, 182 F. 949 (i9o); In re
Jamison, 2 F. 92 (1915); Malone v. Cohen, 236 F. 882 (196); coatre, In
re Pfaffinger, x64 F. 526 (x9o8). They were properly overruled by the
Supreme Court, which pointed out that the Circuit Court's decision would
sake an insurance policy a shelter for valuable assets, and a possible refuge
for fraud.
Bn.LS AND NoTs-DuEss-THE.ATS OF Pizosscu=mo-The defendant
was coerced into giving his promissory note to the plaintiff for his son's debt
by the plaintiffs threats of criminal prosecution of the son. The threatened
prosecution was lawful. Held: The lawfulness of the prosecution does not
destroy the defence of duress in an action on the note. Kohler v. Savage,
167 Pac. 789 (1917).
Threats of prosecution of a wife, parent, or child hive come to be
generally iecognized as exceptions to the old common law rule that, to sustain the defence of duress in an action on a contract, the threatened prosecution must have been against the contracting party. Embry v. Adams, 191
Ala. 291 (1915). However, some courts have refused their aid in cases of
contracts induced by such threats where the prosecution threatened was lawful. Eddy v. Herrin, 17 Me. 338 (i84o); Mascolo v. Montesanto, 6z Conn.
So,

s5

(i89i); Bailey v. Devine,

323

Ga. 653, 65S (z9o5).

These cases seem

to proceed on the theory that, the inducement of stifling a criminal prosecution having been illegal, the transaction is void; and both parties having
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been equally guilty, neither will be htlped, but they will be left as they then.
stand, even though the contract may have been executed. Adams v. Barrett,
rGa. 4o4 (t848) ; Booker v. Wingo, 29 S. C. 116, t22 (1887).
On the other hand, in the majority of jurisdictions, especially in modem
decisions, it has been held that the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the
threatened prosecution makes no difference; the coerced party in either
event may be relieved. Ilensinger v. Dyer, 147 Mo. 219,. 227 (88) ; Adams v.
Irving 'Pank, z16 N. Y. 6o6 (1889); Williamson v. Ackerman, 17 Kan. 0
(xo8).
Where relief has been granted, some of the decisions accord with the
principal case in making duress, and the undue influence it implies, the
grounds thereof. Morse v. Woodworth, 155 Mass. 233 (iSgi); Galusha v.
Sherman, 1o5 Wis. 263, 277 (goo); Williamson v. Ackerman, jupra. Other
decisions have gone on the theory that such contracts are oppoied to public
policy. Budd v. Rutherford, 4 Ind. App. 386 (189); McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Miller, s4 Neb. 644 (1898) ; Gorringe v. Reed, 23 Utah 12,
131 (1901).

By the latter reasoning, these contracts are absolutely void,

and it has been held there can be no binding r4tifiration of them. Stanard v.
Sampson, 99 Pac. 796 (1909). However, where duress is made the ground
of relief, it seems the contracts are merely voidable.

Morse v. Woodworth,

supra; Green v. Moss, 65 Ill. App. 594 (1896). Ratification may accordingly
take place. Miller v. Minor Lumber Co., 98 Mich. 163 (1893). It has also
been vaguely intimated that the right to avoid may even be lost by the laches
of the obligor, but no decision or dicta definitely expressing this idea have
as yet appeared.
MAS'rS AND SERVAN-PAREN'S LIABILITY Pot Torts oF CnnznTIJseuatis
FoM Auromonsi_,-The defendant bought an automobile for the enjoyment
of himself and his family. His nineteen-year-old daughter, while driving the
car, with her fathers permission, for her own pleasure, injured the plaintiff.
Held: The defendant was not liable for her tort. Blair v. Broadwater, 93
S. E. 632 (Va. 1917).
Apart from any question of agency, the general rule is that a father
cannot, on the grounds of parental relationship alone, be held liable for
injuries caused by the tortious acts oi his minor child, with which he is in
no way connected. Brohl v. Lingeman. 41 Mich. 711 (t879); Malmberg w
Bartos, 83 1I1. App. 481 (t898); Mirick v. Suchy, 74 Kan. 71S (i9o6). The
rule has been stated that he is liable "only on the same grounds that he would
be responsible for the wrong of any other person." Broadstreet v. Hall, 168
Ind. 192, z99 (s9o7). Accordingly the parent is liable in all jurisdictions
when the child at the time of the act actually stood in the relation of servant
to him, by virtue of his commands or express authorization. Schaeffer v.
Usterbrink, 67 Wis. 495 (t886) ; Jennings v. Schwab, 64 Mo. App. 13 (1895);
Broadstreet v. Hall, hupr.
However, in some jurisdictions the doctrine has developed that, in cases
like the principal case, where the father buys a car for the pleasure of his
family, and his child drives it for his own accommodation, the child, while
so engaged is the agent of his parent, and engaged in his business, and the
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parent is therefore liable for his negligence. McNeal v. McKain, 33 Old. 449
(t9t2); Marshall v. Taylor. t68 Mo. App. 24o (1912); Birch v. Abercrombie,
74 Wash. 486 (1913). These cases proceed on a presumption of an agency
created by the parental relation. The father's liability is particularly strongly
predicated when the son is driving some other members of the family, and
not himself only. Winn v. Haliday. 69 So. 685 ('915).
It is well settled that any other person permitted to use an automobile
for his own accommodation is not acting as agent for the accommodation of
the owner. Steffen v. McNaughton, T42 Wis. 49 (gio); Hartnett v. Gryznish, 218 Mass. 2-5 (194); Reilly v. Connable, 214 N. Y. 586 (giS). It is
difficult to see. therefore, how a child under exactly the same circumstances
becomes an agent by virtue of his relationship merely, and thus subjects his
father to liability. Many jurisdictions have adopted this attitude, and hold
in accord with the principal case. Doran v. Thompson, 76 N. J. L. 7S4
(igog); Parker v. Wilson, z79 Ala. 36t (1912); Blaricom v. Dodgson, 22
N. Y. 111 (1917).
Similar confusion exists on the question of the husband's responsibility
for his wife's torts under the same conditions. Crawford v. Melhenney,
171 Ia. 6o6 (19S); Farthing v. Strouse, 172 App. Div. 523 (N. Y. 196);
Hutchins v. Haffner, t6l Pac. 966 (CoL 1917). The modern decisions, like
the parent and child cases, are based on the doctrine of respondeat superior,
and the common law theory of a husband's liability, to a great extent, for his
wife's torts regardless of any agency, has'been lost sight of, although the
latter is by far the.older doctrine, and probably the real historic basis for
such decisions as hold him liable. Thus in both classes of cases it seems
that the father's or husband's liability varies entirely with the court's willingness to adopt the presumption of an agency arising purely from the family
relation.
roa
AND SEvRANT-WoRRUcN's CoumNsAriox-Racovny
MAsrE
DiszAsa--A workman inhaled dust from hides. The dust contained germs
which got into his throat and caused his death from septic infection. Held:
The workman's family was entitled to compensation. Dove v. Alpena
Leather Co, 164 N. W. 253 (Mich. 1917).
The broad principles upon which recovery for disease under the Workmen's Compensation Acts may be had are well worked out. The diseases
for which compensation is claimed may be those suffered independently of an
accidental injury, or those suffered in connection with such an injury. The
first class may again be divided into so-called occupational diseases whkh are
a normal and expectable result of the employment, and diseases arising from
some unusual condition of the employment.
In the absence of special provisions for certain specified occupational
diseases, as in the English act, compensation for industrial diseases is almost
everywhere denied. Steel v. Cammel 11905] 2 K. B. 232; Eke v. HartDyke J19101 2 K. B. 677. Most of the statutes require a compensable injury
to be a "personal injury by accident." Four States, Michigan, Ohio, Connecticut. and Massachusetts omit the words "by accident." Of these, the Michi.
gan courts have denied recovery on the ground that the word accidental was
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used elsewhere in the statute. Adams v. White Lead Works, 182 Mkh. zV
(1914). Connecticut and Ohio have also denied compensation, Industrial
Commission v. Brown, rto Ohio 309 (ig15); Miller v. American Wire Co.,
90 Conn. 349 (x915), on the grounds (i) That in those States theretofore

the amount of the premiums had been calculated on the basis of injuries, not
diseases and injuries, and (2) that there was grave practical difficulty in fixing a definite date as the beginning of disease. Massachusetts, however.
allows compensation. In re Hurle, 214 Mass. 223 (1914); Johnson v. Accident Co, 217 Mass. 388 (1914). The reasons are: (T) That the same economic
and humanitarian reasons that apply to compensation for accidents apply to
occupational diseases. (2) While a temporary hardship will be worked
through the fact that insurance was calculated on injuries, administrative construction cannot control judicial construction, and insurance rates will immediately adapt themselves to the change.
Even in Massachusetts, compensation for a general breakdown due to
overwork or long continued strain is denied. In re Magelet. r16 N. F_. 979
(1917). They hold, therefore, that a disease to be compensable must not
merely develop during the employment, but must be caused by the conditions
which the claimant must encounter therein, or by the peculiar character of
the work which he is required to do. An injury which is gradual and extends
over a long time is compensable only if peculiar to the employment. Of
course, those jurisdictions which deny recovery for occupational- disease deny
it also for general breakdown. Walker v. Hockney Bros., 2 B. W. C C. a*
(igog) ; Black v. New Zealand Shipping Co., 6 B. W. C. C. 72D (ig!3).
Diseases which are the resulh of some unusual incident of the employment, and not a reasonably to be anticipated result of pursuing the work are
compensable. It can be said that they arose from some identifiable occasion,
and therefore are distinguishable from occupational diseases. Kelly v. Coal
Co., 4 B. W. C. C. 417 ('9::) ; Alloa Coal Co. v. Drylie, 6 B. W. C. C. 398
(1913) ; Banbeary v. Clugg, 8 B. W. C C 37 (1914), all of which were en.
forced exposure cases; In re McPhee, to9 N. E. 633 (Mass. 1914); Vennen v.
Lumber Co, 154 N. W. 64o (Wis. 1915); Plass v. Central New England R. R.
Co., 155 N. Y. S. 854 (i915), a case of ivy poisoning; Larke v. Life Ins. Co., 9o
Conn. 303 (19:5), where erysipelas developed from frostbite; Hiers v. Hull
164 N. Y. S. 767 (i915); Higgins v. Campbell [igo5] A. C. 23A, in both of
which the entrance of a disease germ was held to be an accident in a business
which was ordinarily healthy. Voluntary as distinguished from enforced
exposure (see .jupra)is not compensable, for the injury must arise out of the
employment as well-as in the course thereof. McLuckie v. Watson, 6 B. W.
C. C. 85o (1913). Sunstroke and heat prostration are compensable, Ismay v.
Williamson, 1908 A. C. 437; Maskery v. Shipping Co., 7 B. W. C. C. 42
('914). unless it can be said to be a probable result of the employment. Olson
v. The Dorset, 6 B. W. C. C. 658 (1913). In a close case the decson of the
arbitrator almost invariably stands.
The theory of all the above cases is that. provided there is an unusual
combination of circumstances that could be called an accident connected with
the injury, the accident need not happen to the workman so long as the
injury afflicts him. The injury may develop a -onsiderable time after the
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accident. Connecticut in such cases denies compensation. Linnane v. The
Aetna Brewing Co., 9z Conn. 158 (z916). The Connecticut courts hold that
an accidental injury must be one simultaneous with the accident, and cannot
be a mere accidental exposure from which injury develops after the lapse of
some short time.

